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RECENT DECISIONS
ADOPTION-ABRGATION-No RELIEF IN ABSENCE OF ExPREss
STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION.7-In March of this year, two cases were
decided which indicate the desirability of a revision of the adoption
law relative to abrogation. In Matter of Banfield,' a foster mother
sought to abrogate an adoption as to the foster father from whom she
had been divorced. Although the father had consented to the pro-
ceeding, the application was denied on the ground that no provision
exists in the statute 2 for partial abrogation. In the other case, Matter
of Eaton,8 the adopted child deserted the foster parents after reach-
ing majority. In affirming a reversal of the trial court which had
granted the parents' petition for abrogation, the Court of Appeals
held that the statute does not provide for such relief after the child
has become an adult.
The adoptive relation may be terminated in several ways. The
original adoption order may be annulled where the parties failed to
comply strictly with the statute,4 where there was fraud perpetrated
upon the court,5 or where there was a lack of jurisdiction.6 In New
York and several other jurisdictions, an adoption valid in its incep-
tion may be terminated by recourse to an abrogation statute. Failure
of parental duties,7 development of certain diseases in the child," and
discovery that the child is of a different race from the foster parents 9
are among the grounds allowed for abrogation.
1204 Misc. 206, 121 N. Y. S. 2d 9 (County Ct. 1953).
2 N. Y. Dom. REx. LAW §§ 116-118.
3305 N. Y. 162, 111 N. E. 2d 431 (1953).4 Murphy v. Brooks, 120 Misc. 704, 199 N. Y. Supp. 660 (Sup. Ct. 1923)
(failure to personally appear and to acknowledge consent) ; Matter of Gallegos,
21 Ariz. 250, 187 Pac. 573 (1920) ("unknown" father must be served by
publication).5 Stevens v. Halstead, 181 App. Div. 198, 168 N. Y. Supp. 142 (2d Dep't
1917).6 Matter of Johnston, 76 Misc. 374, 137 N. Y. Supp. 92 (Surr. Ct. 1912).
7N. Y. Dom. Rn. LAW § 117; ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 4 (1940); ARK. STAT.
c. 56, § 110 (1947). See also TEx. REV. STAT. art. 46a, § 7 (Vernon, 1948).
8 ALA. CODE tit. 27, §4 (1940); ARK. STAT. c. 56, § 110 (1947); CAL.
CIV. CoDE § 227b (1951); IOWA CODE § 600.7 (1950); Laws of Minn. 1951,
c. 508, § 10; Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 453.130 (1949); UTAH CoDn ANN. § 78-30-13
(1953). These statutes apply only where the disease results from pre-existing
causes unknown to foster parents at time of adoption.
1 Ky. REv. STAT. § 199.540 (Baldwin, Supp. 1953) ; Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.130(1949). Other grounds for abrogation are allowed. N. Y. DoM. RE. LAw
§ 116 (consent of all parties) and § 118 (misconduct of child); ARK. STAT.
c. 56, § 110 (1947) (divorce of foster parents); ME. REv. STAT. c. 145, § 41
(1944) ("good cause"); VA. CoDE § 63-362 (1950) (where "manifestly right
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Where it is to the foster child's best interest, New York per-
mits abrogation upon the consent of all interested parties,10 upon the
failure of parental duties,"1 or upon the serious misconduct of the
child.12  Because of the statutory nature of the entire law of adop-
tion, courts have demanded strict compliance with the abrogation
statutes.' 3 The paramount consideration is the welfare of the child,
even where the statute also requires observance of the foster father's
interest. 14
Originally, the New York adoption statute applied only to vol-
untary adoptions, and the abrogation statute was designed to apply
solely to such adoptions.15 In 1884, the Legislature expanded the
adoption law to provide for the adoption of dependent children from
institutions, and sections were added to permit the abrogation of
such adoptions.16 In 1938, the abrogation statutes were partially
amended to apply to both types of adoptions.' 7 But the section per-
mitting abrogation for misconduct by the foster child-Section 118
of the Domestic Relations Law-has never been so amended. No
reported case allows the abrogation of a voluntary adoption under
this section, and theoretically no such proceeding is authorized.
Both of the instant cases continue the traditional judicial re-
quirement of strict statutory compliance: the Eaton case refused
abrogation because there is no statutory provision for such relief
once the child has reached majority; the Banfield case refused partial
abrogation because the statute makes no provision for that type of
proceeding.
The Banfield case raises the problem of the divorce of the foster
parents. It would appear that the only method of obtaining the
result desired in the instant case is by the circuitous procedure of
full abrogation followed by a readoption by the mother and her new
spouse. The Legislature might well consider the advisability of
and proper"). In two jurisdictions the child may disaffirm upon reaching his
majority. VT. REv. STAT. §9956 (1947); W. VA. CODE ANN. §4760 (1949).
"ON. Y. Dom. REt. LAW § 116.
11 Id. § 117. The foster parent himself may utilize this section. Matter of
Anonymous, 185 Misc. 962, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 159 (Surr. Ct. 1945).
12 N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 118. Mere behavior causing annoyance is in-
sufficient [Matter of Buss, 234 App. Div. 299, 254 N. Y. Supp. 852 (4th Dep't
1932)], but unruly and uncontrollable conduct [Matter of Anonymous, 157
Misc. 951, 285 N. Y. Supp. 827 (Surr. Ct. 1936)], or misconduct coupled with
desertion [Matter of Souers, 135 Misc. 521, 238 N. Y. Supp. 738 (Surr. Ct.
1930)], is sufficient to satisfy the statute, although even then the court is re-
luctant to abrogate [Id. at 526, 238 N. Y. Supp. at 744].
13 See Mulligan v. Wingard, 72 Ga. App. 539, 34 S. E. 2d 305 (1945).
14 See Matter of Buss, supra note 12, 254 N. Y. Supp. at 853.
15 Laws of N. Y. 1873, c. 830, §§ 5, 13. "'Voluntary adoption' shall mean
any adoption other than that of a minor who has been placed for adoption by
an authorized agency." N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 109(5).
16 Laws of N. Y. 1884, c. 438, §§ 12-13.
17 Laws of N. Y. 1938, c. 606, §§ 116-117. See Note of Revisers, quoted
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allowing partial abrogation in cases like the instant one, where, after
a divorce, the foster parent retaining custody of the child remarries.'
8
A more important item for legislative attention is the present
limitation of Section 118 of the Domestic Relations Law relative to
the abrogation of institutional adoptions. Where all the parties con-
sent, or where the foster parents fail in their duties, abrogation is
allowed regardless of whether or not the adoption is institutional.'9
Since the grave misbehavior of the child would give rise to the same
intra-family tensions in the case of voluntary as in the case of in-
stitutional adoptions, there seems to be no valid reason for retaining
in the adoption law the distinction between voluntary and institu-
tional adoptions, and for restricting the application of the section in
question to the latter.
CONFLICT OF LAws - INCESTUOUS MARRIAGES - UNCLE-NIECE
MARRIAGE, VALID WHERE PERFORMED, VALID IN NEw YORK.-
Decedent and her uncle by the half-blood, both New York residents
of the Jewish faith, were married in Rhode Island which exempts
from its incest prohibitions marriages between Jews within the de-
grees of consanguinity permitted by their religion.' Appellant,
daughter of decedent, petitioned for letters of administration on the
ground that this marriage was incestuous and void pursuant to New
York statute.2 The Court of Appeals, applying the rule that a mar-
riage valid where contracted is valid everywhere, held that the New
York statute did not extend to a foreign marriage of domiciliaries,
and that the marriage was not so repugnant to the public policy as
to be adjudicated invalid. Matter of May, 305 N. Y. 486, 114 N. E.
2d 4 (1953).
Although marriage is considered a civil contract,3 it is regu-
lated and prescribed by law to a greater extent than other contracts
because of the social importance of the relationship created.4 To
in 14 McKiNNEY'S CONS. LAWS OF N. Y. ANN. 341, 344 (1941).
18 In Arkansas, abrogation is allowed if the foster parents are separated or
divorced within two years of the adoption, if the child is still a minor. ARK.
STAT. c. 56, § 110 (1947).
19 N. Y. Dom. REr. LAW §§ 116-117.
1 R. I. GEN. LAWS c. 415, §§ 1-4 (1938).2N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW §5(3), Audley v. Audley, 196 App. Div. 103,
187 N. Y. Supp. 652 (1st Dep't 1921).
3 N. Y. Dom. RE.. LAW § 10; see di Lorenzo v. di Lorenzo, 174 N. Y.
467, 472, 67 N. E. 63, 64 (1903).
4 See Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N. Y. 268, 5 N. E. 2d 815 (1936); see
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 211 (1888); Pisciotta v. Buccino, 22 N. J.
1953 ]
